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Abstract
We study the price competition in a duopoly with an arbitrary number of buyers. Each seller can
offer multiple units of a commodity depending on the availability of the commodity which is random
and may be different for different sellers. Sellers seek to select a price that will be attractive to the buyers
and also fetch adequate profits. The selection will in general depend on the number of units available
with the seller and also that of its competitor - the seller may only know the statistics of the latter. The
setting captures a secondary spectrum access network, a non-neutral Internet, or a microgrid network
in which unused spectrum bands, resources of ISPs, and excess power units constitute the respective
commodities of sale. We analyze this price competition as a game, and identify a set of necessary and
sufficient properties for the Nash Equilibrium (NE). The properties reveal that sellers randomize their
price using probability distributions whose support sets are mutually disjoint and in decreasing order
of the number of availability. We prove the uniqueness of a symmetric NE in a symmetric market, and
explicitly compute the price distribution in the symmetric NE.
Index Terms
pricing, game theory, micro-grid networks, cognitive radio networks, secondary spectrum networks,
network neutrality
I. INTRODUCTION
The Research Challenges and Goals
We consider a market with two sellers, where each seller offers multiple commodities for sale.
The commodities that are available for sale are randomly generated. In other words, sellers do
not control the amount supplied or they may obtain the commodities from a residual supply. We
M. H. Lotfi and Saswati Sarkar are with the Department of Electrical and Systems Engineering at University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, PA, U.S.A. Their email addresses are lotfm@seas.upenn.edu and swati@seas.upenn.edu respectively.
Part of this work was presented in Allerton’12 [1].
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2investigate the price selection strategy for sellers in presence of uncertainty in competition using
Game Theory [2]. Customers shop around for the lowest available prices. Therefore sellers seek
to set prices that will ensure that their commodities are sold and also fetch adequate profit. In
our model, a seller is not aware of the number of units available to her competitor before quoting
her price. Thus, the competition that each seller faces is uncertain, and different sellers have
different number of goods available (heterogeneous availability). Each seller selects the price per
unit depending on the number of units she has available for sale, the statistics of the availability
process for her competitor, and the demand. In general, each seller chooses her price randomly
using different probability distributions for different availability levels. Thus, the strategy of each
player is a vector of probability distributions. For instance, if a seller can potentially offer up to
three units of commodity, her vector of strategies would be (Φ1(.),Φ2(.),Φ3(.)), where Φi(.) is
the price selection probability distribution when the seller offers i units.
Due to uncertainty in competition, quoting a high price by a seller enhances the risk of not
being able to sell the commodity offered by that seller. On the other hand, although selecting a
low price increases the chance of winning the competition, it also decreases the profit earned by
the seller. Therefore, pricing in presence of uncertainty in competition is a risk-reward tradeoff.
It is not a priori clear that how offering multiple number of units affects the price selection by
sellers. For instance, a seller with a large number of available units may be motivated to quote
a low price, since in the event of winning the competition, a small amount of profit per unit
would result in a large total profit. On the other hand, a seller maybe enticed to select a high
price when the availability is high to significantly increase her overall profit, even at the risk of
not being able to sell the available units. We focus on investigating the impact of heterogeneous
availability and uncertain competition on the aforementioned risk-reward tradeoff.
Uncertainty in competition is an integral feature of diverse sets of applications. In Section VIII,
we outline the connection between the decision problem we considered and three different
emerging application domains: primary/secondary market, a non-neutral Internet, and microgrid
networks.
Contributions
We start by positioning our work in the context of the existing literature. We next model the
price selection problem as a one-shot non-cooperative game (Section II). The sellers are allowed
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3to have different probability distributions for different availability levels (asymmetric market). In
Section III, we identify key properties that every NE pricing strategy should satisfy when demand
is greater than the maximum possible availability level. The properties reveal that the sellers
randomize their price using probability distributions whose support sets are mutually disjoint
and in decreasing order of the number of availability. In the context of the aforementioned risk-
reward tradeoff, sellers opt for low-risk pricing when they have high availability. In Section IV,
we prove that any strategy profile that satisfies the properties listed in Section III constitutes
an NE regardless of the relation between the demand and the number of available units. This
sufficiency result naturally leads to an algorithm (Appendix C-A) for computing the strategies
that satisfy the properties in Section III.
In Section V, we consider a symmetric market and prove that these properties are also
necessary conditions for a NE regardless of the relation between the demand and the number
of available units. We prove that the symmetric NE uniquely exists, and obtain an algorithm
for explicitly computing it. Note that the uniqueness is specific to the symmetric market- our
analysis in Appendices C-B and C-C reveals that an asymmetric market allows for multiple Nash
equilibria. Results are generalized to the case of random demand in Section VI. The asymptotic
behavior of the symmetric NE (when m→∞) is investigated through numerical simulations in
Section VII.
Related Literature
Price competition among different entities has been extensively studied in [3]–[12]. In eco-
nomics literature as also in the context of specific applications, uncertainty in competition has
been investigated when the availability level is either zero or one [13]–[17]. The strategy profile
of each seller consists of only one probability distribution since sellers need to select a price
only when they have one unit available for sale. We, however, characterize the Nash equilibrium
pricing strategies when sellers have arbitrary and potentially different number of available units
for sale (not merely zero or one). In this case, different price selection strategies may be required
for different number of available units. Thus, the pricing strategy profile of each seller is a
collection of probability distributions, one for each availability value. Therefore both results and
proofs are substantially different from previous works.
Another genre of work allows sellers to control the amount of commodities they would
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4generate for sale [18]–[25]. In these works, sellers (e.g. power generators) bid a supply function
1 to a central auctioneer. Given the demand and the bids submitted, the auctioneer solves an
optimization problem to determine the number of units needed to be generated by the sellers
and subsequently the price that should be paid to them. In [18]–[20], the setting is a uniform-
price procurement auction in which the price is equal for different sellers, i.e. the clearing price.
However, in [21]–[25], authors investigate a pay-as-bid (discriminatory) procurement auction
which is similar to our work in the sense that the price can be different for the bidder (sellers
in our case). In these works, central entity accepts the offers submitted by the sellers and
pays the accepted offers based on the bid submitted. For instance in [23], authors provide
a characterization of mixed equilibria over increasing supply curves. In other words, in their
characterization, the price per infinitesimal unit of the commodity is increasing, i.e., the higher
the number of units produced, the higher the price per unit. Note that in [21]–[23] authors
consider divisible goods, i.e. continuous amount of goods for sale. However, in [24] and [25],
the number of units is effectively discrete. In this sense, they have a closer model to ours.
Nonetheless, the main distinction of our work with this entire genre of work is that we consider
scenarios where sellers do not control the amount of commodities they produce. This distinction
in the setup, lead to major differences in the formulation, analyses, and results.
II. MARKET MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Market Model
First, we define some preliminary notation. Then sellers’ decision and information are de-
scribed.
1) Preliminary notation: We consider a market with two sellers in which each seller owns
multiple number of the same commodity and quotes a price per unit. The total demand of the
market is d units. For simplicity, the demand is assumed to be deterministic. The generalization
to random d is straightforward, and is presented in Section VI.
Buyers prefer the seller who quotes a lower price per unit, and they are equally likely to buy a
unit from sellers who select equal prices. Thus, if sellers have a, b units to sell respectively and
quote prices of x, y per unit, where x < y, then they respectively sell min{a, d}, min{b, (d−a)+}
1A supply function is a function that maps the price of the commodity under sale to the amount a producer will produce for
sale.
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5units, where z+ denotes max{z, 0}. The cost of each transaction is c. Therefore, a seller earns a
profit of i(x− c) when she sells i units with price x per unit. Because of regulatory restrictions
or because of valuations that buyers associate with purchase of each unit, the price selected by
each seller should be bounded by some constant v > c, i.e. x ≤ v. The availability of each seller
is random:
Terminology 1. We denote mk as the maximum possible number of available units of seller
k. Let qkj ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that seller k has j ∈ {0, . . . , mk} units available, and
~qk = (qk0, . . . , qkmk).
The availability of sellers may for example follow binomial distributions B(m1, p1) and
B(m2, p2). Specifically, if p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.3, m1 = 3, and m2 = 2, then ~q1 = (18 ,
3
8
, 3
8
, 1
8
)
and ~q2 = ( 49100 ,
42
100
, 9
100
).
We assume that sellers have zero unit available for sale with positive probability, i.e., qk0 > 0
for k ∈ {1, 2}, and the competition is uncertain, i.e., qk¯i < 1 for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , mk} for at least
one seller k. 2 Note that if competition is deterministic for both sellers, then the problem is
trivial.
Terminology 2. For each seller k, let k¯ denote the other seller, i.e., if k = 1 (respectively,
k = 2), then k¯ = 2 (respectively k¯ = 1).
2) Sellers’ decisions and information: Sellers select their price based on the number of units
they offer in the market. Before choosing her price, a seller does not know the number of units
of the commodity that her competitor has available for sale and the price per unit her competitor
selects. She is however aware of the demand and the distributions for the above quantities. A
seller may select her price randomly.
Terminology 3. Let Φkj(.) be the probability distribution that the seller k ∈ {1, 2} uses for
selecting price per unit when she offers j units. Let p˜kj and v˜kj be the infimum and the supremum
of the support set3 of Φkj(.). The strategy profile of seller k is Θk(.) = (Φk1(.), . . . ,Φkmk(.)).
2Note that if this exists i, j ∈ {0, . . . ,mk} such that q1i = 1 and q2j = 1, then both sellers know the exact number of
available units with the other seller. Thus the competition is deterministic.
3The support set of a probability distribution is the smallest closed set such that its complement has probability zero under
the distribution function.
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6An example of probability distributions, support sets, and their infimums and supremums is
presented in Figure 1. In this figure, the infimums (p˜kj’s) are illustrated explicitly, and v˜kj =
p˜k,j−1 (For instance, v˜13 = p˜12). Note that, Figure 1 presents the distributions which are strictly
increasing between the infimum and the supremum of their support sets. However, the probability
distributions in general may consist of strictly increasing and flat parts. For example, a probability
distribution that is strictly increasing over intervals [a, b] and [c, d], and flat over interval [b, c].
Unlike the previous example, the support set of this probability distribution ([a, d]∪ [c, d]) is not
connected.
B. Problem Formulation
Note that in general, the number of units a seller sells and her profit can be random.
Terminology 4. Let uk(Θk(.),Θk¯(.)) denotes the expected profit of seller k when she adopts
strategy profile Θk(.) and her competitor adopts Θk¯(.).
In a Bayesian game (where players are modeled as risk-neutral), rational players are seeking
to maximize their expected payoff, given their beliefs about the other players (
Definition 1. A Nash equilibrium (NE) 4 is a strategy profile such that no seller can improve
her expected profit by unilaterally deviating from her strategy. Therefore, (Θ⋆1(.),Θ⋆2(.)) is a NE
if for each seller k:
uk(Θ
∗
k(·),Θ
∗
k¯(·)) ≥ uk(Θ˜k(·),Θ
∗
k¯(·)), ∀ Θ˜k(·).
Terminology 5. With slight abuse of notation, we denote ukl(x) as the expected profit that seller
k earns, and Bkl(x) as the expected number of units that seller k sells, when she offers l units for
sale with price x per unit, respectively (the dependence on the competitor’s strategy is implicit
in this simplified notation).
Clearly, ukl(x) = Bkl(x)(x− c). (1)
Note that ukl
l
is the expected utility per unit of availability. Thus, Ak,l,j(x) = 1l ukl(x)−
1
j
ukj(x)
4Clearly, our game is a Bayesian game with the number of available units for sale being the type of a player. For the sake
of notational convenience, we use Nash equilibrium as an alternative for Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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7is the difference between the utility per availability for availability levels l and j. We will see
that Ak,l,j(x) plays an important role throughout in the proofs, which motivates the following
terminology:
Terminology 6. Let Ak,l,j(x) = 1l ukl(x) −
1
j
ukj(x) = (x − c)Bk,l,j(x), where Bk,l,j(x) =
1
l
Bkl(x)−
1
j
Bkj(x).
Terminology 7. Let ek = (d−mk¯)+.
Note that for all x ≤ v,
Bkl(x) = l l = 1, . . . , ek (2)
as k will sell all she offers in this case given that the total offering is less than the demand. We
would later obtain the expression for Bkl(x) under the NE strategy profiles when l > ek.
Definition 2. A price x is said to be a best-response price for seller k when she offers j units
if ukj(x) ≥ ukj(a) for all a ∈ [0, v].
Note that a NE-strategy profile selects with positive probability only amongst the best-response
prices. Thus, all the elements of support sets are best responses except potentially those on the
boundaries (elements of boundaries may not be best responses) if there is a discontinuity in the
utility at those points.
We seek to determine the Nash equilibrium strategy profile of sellers. If m1 +m2 ≤ d, since
there is no competition between sellers, both sellers offer their units with the monopoly price,
v at the NE. We therefore assume that m1 +m2 > d.
III. PROPERTIES OF A NE WHEN d > max{m1, m2}
Note that from Corollary 5.2 in [26], a mixed strategy NE exists for our model. In this section,
we investigate the necessary conditions for a strategy to be an NE when d > max{m1, m2} (The-
orem 1). We will explicitly point out whenever we use the assumption that d > max{m1, m2}.
Theorem 1. A NE must satisfy the following properties when d > max{m1, m2},
1) For each k, there exists a threshold such that seller k offers price v with probability one if
she has the availability level less than or equal to this threshold. This threshold, denoted
as lk henceforth, is such that:
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8a) lk ∈ {ek, . . . , mk − 1}
b) l1 + l2 = d− 1 or l1 + l2 = d
2) When seller k has lk + 1 5 units, she uses distribution Φk,lk+1(.)
a) whose support set is [p˜k,lk+1, v],
b) which is continuous throughout except possibly at v, and
c) has a jump at v for at most one value of k ∈ {1, 2}, and size of such a jump is less
than 1
3) When the availability level is i ∈ {lk + 2, . . . , mk}6, seller k uses distribution Φki(.)
a) whose support set is [p˜k,i, p˜k,i−1],
b) which is continuous throughout
c) p˜1,mk = p˜2,mk
4) The utility of seller k when she offers i units is equal for all prices in the support set of
Φki(.), except possibly at price v (if v belongs to her support set).
In Appendix C, we will present an algorithm to explicitly compute the NE strategies satis-
fying properties in Theorem 1. Using this algorithm, in Figure 1, we plot an NE probability
distribution of price when the vector of availability distributions are ~q1 = [0.3, 0.2, 0.2, 0.3] and
~q2 = [0.4, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2], the demand , i.e. d, is 3, v = 10, and c = 6. Note that in this case
l1 = l2 = 1, and l1 + l2 = d − 1 (part 1 at Theorem 1). This means that both sellers offer
price v with probability one if they have one unit of commodity available. When sellers have
availability l1 + 1 = 2 and l2 + 1 = 2 units available for sale, they use probability distributions
Φ12(.) and Φ22(.), respectively, whose support sets are [p˜12, v] and [p˜22, v], respectively (part 2a
of the Theorem). In addition, these distributions are continuous throughout except possibly at
v (part 2b). Furthermore, only the probability distribution Φ22(.) has a jump at price v and the
size of this jump is less than one (part 2c of Theorem 1). When sellers have availability level
l1 + 2 = l2 + 2 = 3, they use probability distributions Φ13(.) and Φ23(.), respectively, whose
support sets are [p˜13, p˜12] and [p˜23, p˜22], respectively (part 3a of Theorem 1). In addition, these
probability distributions are continuous throughout (part 3b). Note that p˜13 = p˜23 = p˜ (part 3c
of the Theorem). More numerical examples are presented in Appendix C-B.
5The same lk as the one in part 1.
6The same lk as the one in part 1
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Fig. 1: An example of an NE pricing strategy, when d = 3, Supp = Support Set. Note that
Φ11 and Φ21 have a jump of magnitude one, and Φ22 has a jump of size 0.6 at v.
We prove Theorem 1 using the following results which we first state and prove later.
1) The probability distribution of price, Φki(x) for i ∈ {1, . . . , mk}, is continuous for x < v
(Section III-B, Property 3).
2) The lower bound of prices are equal for both sellers (Section III-C, Property 4).
3) There is no gap between support sets (Section III-D, Property 5).
4) Support sets are disjoint barring common boundary points, and are in decreasing order of
the number of available units for sale (Section III-D, Property 6).
5) The structure of NE at price v: A seller selects v with probability one, if and only if the
number of available units with her is less than or equal to a threshold lk ∈ {0, 1, . . . , mk−
1}, where l1 + l2 = d or l1 + l2 = d− 1 (Section III-F, Property 7).
Note that in Figure 1, the distributions are continuous and the lower bound of prices are
equal. In addition, every element of the set [p˜, v] belongs to a support set, i.e. there is no gap
between support sets. The support sets of seller one when she offers 3, 2, and 1 unit are [p˜, p˜12],
[p˜12, v], and {v}, respectively. This illustrates the result 4. The result 5 is the same as part 1 in
Theorem 1, and is previously connected to Figure 1.
Henceforth in this section, we focus on proving the necessary results and properties needed
to prove Theorem 1.
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A. Results that we use throughout
Property 1. For each i and k, Φki(c) = 0.
This result follows directly since prices less than cost c are not chosen by sellers. Property 1
therefore rules out jumps at prices x ≤ c.
Proof: Note that for each i, uki(x) ≤ 0 for x ≤ c. But, since Bki(x) ≥ iqk¯0 > 0 for all
x ∈ [0, v], uki(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (c, v]. Thus, no price in [0, c] is a best response for a seller.
Lemma 1, which we use throughout the paper, rules out jumps at prices higher than c.
Lemma 1. Let the strategy profile of player k be Θk(.) = (Φk1(.), . . . ,Φkmk(.)), and Φki(.) have
a jump at x > c. Then for l such that l + i > d, uk¯l(x − ǫ′) > uk¯l(a), ∀a ∈ [x,min{x+ ǫ, v}],
and for all sufficiently small but positive ǫ and ǫ′.
We provide the intuition behind the result and defer the proof to Appendix A. Note that
offering a lower price increases the expected number of units sold by a seller, but decreases
the revenue per unit sold. Suppose that a seller k offers i units with price x with a positive
probability. Let her competitor k¯ have l units available where l + i > d; k¯ can sell a strictly
larger number of units in an expected sense by choosing a price in the left neighborhood of x
(eg, x− ǫ) rather than x or in its right neighborhood. In addition the difference is bounded away
from zero even as the size of the left neighborhood approaches zero. On the other hand, the
difference in the revenue per unit approaches zero as the size of the left neighborhood approaches
zero. Therefore, prices in the left neighborhood of x constitute better responses for the seller
than x or those in its right neighborhood.
The following property fully characterizes the NE when seller k offers i ∈ {1, . . . , ek} units.
Property 2. Φki(x) selects v with probability 1 and any other prices with probability 0 when
i = 1, . . . , ek for each k.
The proof relies on the fact that if a seller offers less than or equal to ek units of commodity,
she can sell all units regardless of the price she quotes. Therefore v strictly dominates all other
prices.
Proof: This statement holds by vacuity if max{m1, m2} ≥ d. Now consider d > max{m1, m2}.
If the seller k offers i ≤ ek units, the total offerings from both sellers are at most d, since the
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other seller offers at most mk¯ units. Thus, the seller k can sell everything it offers with any price
x in interval [0, v]. Therefore for all x ∈ [0, v), uki(x) = i(x− c) < i(v − c) = uki(v). Thus, no
price in [0, v) is a best response. The result follows.
B. Continuity of Price Distribution for Price x < v
Utilizing Lemma 1, we can prove that the distribution of price is continuous for prices less
than v,
Property 3. Φki(x) is continuous for x < v.
Note that in Fig 1, there is no jump in the distributions for prices less than v.
Proof: If i ≤ ek, the property follows from Property 2. Now let i > ek. If x ≤ c, the
property follows from Property 1. Now consider x ∈ (c, v). We use contradiction argument.
Suppose Φki(.) has a jump at price x < v. Since i > ek, there exists l ≤ mk¯ such that l+ i > d.
Using lemma 1, we can say that if Φki(.) has a jump at x, for each l such that l + i > d,
uk¯l(x − ǫ
′) > uk¯l(a), where a ∈ [x,min{x + ǫ, v}], and for all sufficiently small but positive ǫ
and ǫ′. Therefore no price in this interval is a best response for the seller k¯ when she offers l
units. Therefore Φk¯l(x+ ǫ) = Φk¯l(x) for all sufficiently small but positive ǫ and all l such that
l > d− i, i.e. the other seller does not choose any price in [x, x+ ǫ) whenever she offers l units.
Knowing this we can say that Bki(a) = Bki(x) for all a ∈ [x, x + ǫ) for some ǫ > 0 such that
x+ ǫ ≤ v. Therefore,
uki(x) = (x− c)Bki(x) < (x+
ǫ
2
− c)Bki(x+
ǫ
2
) = uki(x+
ǫ
2
) (3)
Thus, x is not a best response for a seller who offers i units. Hence x is chosen with probability
zero, which rules out a jump at x for Φki(.). The property follows.
Based on this property, the distribution of price is continuous for x < v. We will later show
that the price distribution has a jump at v for some availabilities.
Based on the above continuity result, the expression for the expected number of units sold
for all x ∈ [0, v) and l = ek + 1, . . . , mk is,
October 23, 2018 DRAFT
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Bkl(x) = l
d−l∑
i=0
qk¯i + l
m
k¯∑
i=d−l+1
(
1− Φk¯i(x)
)
qk¯i
+
m
k¯∑
i=d−l+1
Φk¯i(x)qk¯i(d− i)
(4)
Note that we assumed d ≥ max{m1, m2} in (4). The first term in the left hand side corresponds
to the situation in which the other seller offers at most d − l units. In this case, seller k will
sell all l units she offered in the market. The second and the third terms are corresponding to
the situation in which the other seller offers more than d− l units with a price higher than and
less than x, respectively. If the other seller offers with price higher than x, seller k is able to
sell the entire l units. On the other hand, if k¯ offers with a price less than x, k will sell d − l
units of commodity.
We can now obtain an expression for ukl(x) for x < v from (1), (2), and (4).
C. Sellers Have Equal Lower Bound of Prices
Note that the example NE distributions presented in Figure 1 have equal lower bounds (p˜ =
p˜13 = p˜23). We now prove that all NE distributions must satisfy this property:
Property 4. The minimum of lower end points of support sets are equal for both sellers.
Mathematically,
p˜1 = p˜2
where, p˜k = min{p˜ki : i = 1, . . . , mk}. Furthermore, p˜1 = p˜2 < v if d < m1 +m2.
If the lower bound of prices for seller k, i.e. p˜k, is lower than that for the other seller, p˜k¯,
then k sells equal number of units in an expected sense by choosing p˜k as any other price in
(p˜k, p˜k¯). Using continuity of distributions for prices less than v, we can say that p˜k¯ is a better
response than p˜k for k, which is a contradiction. The formal proof follows:
Proof: Suppose not. Without loss of generality suppose p˜1 < p˜2 ≤ v. Therefore there exists
j such that p˜1 belongs to the support set of Φ1j(.). Since player 2 does not offer with any price
in the interval [p˜1, p˜2), B1j(p˜1) = B1j(p˜−2 ) 7. Thus u1j(p˜1) < u1j(p˜−2 ) which contradicts the
7f(x−) = limy↑x f(y)
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assumption that p˜1 is a best response for the first player when she offers i units of commodity.
Therefore, the first part of the property follows.
Suppose p˜1 = p˜2 = v. Thus, both sellers choose the price v with probability 1 regardless of
the number of units they have available. Consider seller k. Let l = mk¯. Since m1 + m2 > d,
Lemma 1 implies that uk¯mk¯(v− ǫ) > uk¯mk¯(v). This contradicts the assumption that v is the best
response for seller k. The result follows.
Terminology 8. Let p˜ denote the minimum of lower end points of prices in the NE, i.e. p˜1 =
p˜2 = p˜.
D. The union of support sets cover [p˜, v]
We show that there does not exist an interval of prices in [p˜, v] which is eschewed with
probability 1 by both sellers. If such an interval existed, the cumulative distribution functions of
both sellers would be flat in it, which we rule out below. Note that in Fig 1, the NE distributions
are strictly increasing throughout their support sets, and there is no flat region.
Property 5. There does not exist a, b such that p˜ ≤ a < b ≤ v and Φki(b) = Φki(a) for all
i ∈ {ek + 1, . . . , mk} and k = 1, 2.
If such a and b exist for seller k, this means that regardless of the number of available units,
k does not select any price in the interval (y, z) where y ≤ a, z ≥ b, and y is a best response
when k has an availability level l. This implies that for the competitor, k¯, the expected utility is
strictly increasing in interval [y, b]. Thus k¯ does not select any price in the interval [y, b). This
again implies that for seller k, when she offers l units, price b yields a strictly higher payoff
than y, which is in contradiction with y being a best response for k when offering l units. The
formal proof is as follows:
Proof: Let there be a, b, and k such that p˜ ≤ a < b ≤ v and Φki(b) = Φki(a) for all i. Thus
for ζ such that a < b− ζ < b ≤ v, Φki(b− ζ) = Φki(a). Consider y such that,
y = sup{x|x < a, x ∈ support set of Φkl(.) for an l}
Since support sets are closed, y belongs in the support set of Φkl(·) for some l. Thus, y is a best
response when the availability of player k is l (using Property 3 and y < v).
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In addition, note that Φki(y) = Φki(b − ζ) for all i. Since a < b − ζ < v, from Property
3 and equation (4), the expected number of units sold for the second seller remains constant
for prices in [y, b − ζ ], regardless of the number of units she offers, i.e. Bk¯,.(y) = Bk¯,.(b − ζ).
Thus, uk¯,.(b − ζ) > uk¯,.(y), and player k¯ does not offer any price in the interval [y, b − ζ).
Therefore Φk¯,.(y) = Φk¯,.(b − ζ). Since a < b − ζ < v, from Property 3 and equation (4),
Bkl(y) = Bkl(b − ζ). Thus, ukl(b − ζ) > ukl(y). This is in contradiction with y being a best
response when the availability of player k is l. Therefore, there does not exist a, b such that
p˜ ≤ a < b ≤ v and Φki(b) = Φki(a) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , mk} and k = 1, 2. Also, note that for
i ∈ {1, . . . , ek}, Φki(b) = Φki(a) for p˜ ≤ a < b ≤ v, since support sets for these distributions
only contain v. The result follows.
Remark: In all the previous results, we considered d ≥ max{m1, m2}. In the next section, we
need to consider that d > max{m1, m2}.
E. Support Sets Are Mutually Disjoint and in Decreasing Order of the Number of Availabilities
We start with proving a result, Lemma 2, on Ak,l,j(x) (defined in Section II, Terminology 6).
Note that we use Lemma 2 in subsequent sections as well. We next prove Property 6 using this
result, which leads to the main results of this section: Corollaries 1 and 2.
First, using (2) and (4).
Bk,l,j(x) =−
1
l
d−j∑
i=d−l+1
Φk¯i(x)qk¯i(i− d+ l)
+
mk¯∑
i=d−j+1
Φk¯i(x)qk¯i(d− i)(
1
l
−
1
j
)
(5)
Thus, Bk,l,j(·) is non increasing and non positive with respect to the price x when l > j.
Therefore if l > j then Ak,l,j(x) is non increasing and non positive with respect to x. Based on the
following lemma, Ak,l,j(x) is (strictly) decreasing for v > x ≥ p˜ and l > j if d > max{m1, m2}.
Lemma 2. For each seller k ∈ {1, 2} and every l and j, j < l ≤ mk, Ak,l,j(x) is (strictly)
decreasing for p˜ ≤ x < v when d > max{m1, m2}.
Lemma 2 implies that the high-availability agent sacrifices more expected payoff than the
low-availability agent by increasing her price.
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Since Ak,l,j(.) = (x − c)Bk,l,j(x), knowing that Bk,l,j(x) is non-increasing, lemma follows
if we prove that Bk,l,j(·) is negative. We will prove that Φkmk(x), which is included in the
summation of Bk,l,j(·), is positive for x > p˜ and k ∈ {1, 2}. In addition, the coefficient of
Φkmk(x) is negative since d > max{m1, m2}. Thus, the result follows.
Proof: It is enough to prove that Bk,l,j(x) is non-increasing for x ≥ p˜ and negative for
x > p˜. This yields that Ak,l,j(x) = (x− c)Bk,l,j(x) is strictly decreasing with respect to x.
Note that in (5), Φkj(.)’s are non-negative and non-increasing since they are probability
distributions. In addition, they have negative weights: −(i − d − l) ≤ −1 < 0, 1
l
− 1
j
< 0,
and since d > max{m1, m2}, d − i ≥ d − mk¯ > 0. Thus Bk,l,j(x) is non increasing and non
positive with respect to the price x when l ≥ j. To prove that Bk,l,j(x) is negative for x > p˜,
since the distributions in (5) have (strictly) negative weights , it is enough to prove that at least
one of the Φkj(.)’s is included in the summation of Bk,l,j(.) is positive, i.e. not all of them are
zero. We will prove that Φkmk(x) > 0 for x > p˜ and k ∈ {1, 2}.
Suppose not and there exists x > p˜ such that x ≤ p˜kmk . By Property 5, there exists an ǫ > 0
and an availability level j 6= {1, . . . , ek, mk} such that [p˜kmk − ǫ, p˜kmk ] belongs to the support
set of Φkj(.) and p˜kj < p˜kmk . Thus ukj(p˜kmk) = ukj(p˜kmk − ǫ). In addition, Bk,mk,j(x) is the
weighted summation of Φk¯i(.) for i ∈ {ek¯ + 1, . . . , mk¯}. Property 5 implies that p˜kj belongs
to at least one of the support sets of Φk¯i(.) for i ∈ {ek¯ + 1, . . . , mk¯}. The distribution Φk¯i(.)
is included in the summation of Bk,mk,j(x), and its coefficient is negative. Thus, Ak,mk,j(x) is
strictly decreasing with respect to x for x > p˜kj . Thus Ak,mk,j(p˜kmk − ǫ) > Ak,mk,j(p˜kmk). Using
ukj(p˜kmk) = ukj(p˜kmk − ǫ), we can conclude that ukmk(p˜kmk) = ukmk.max < ukmk(p˜kmk − ǫ).
This contradicts with p˜k,mk belonging to the support set of Φkmk(.). The result follows.
Note that in the previous lemma, we used d > max{m1, m2} to prove that Ak,l,j(x) is
decreasing for p˜ ≤ x < v. The following properties characterize the NE for price less than
v.
Property 6. For k ∈ {1, 2}, the support set of Φkl(.) is a subset of [p˜, p˜kj] ∪ [v] for all integers
j ∈ [1, l).
For example, in Figure 1, the support set for seller 1 and availability 3 is [p˜, p˜12], which is a
subset of the mentioned set.
Proof: First note that for j ∈ {1, . . . , ek} property follows, since p˜kj = v by Property 2.
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Now consider j > ek. Consider support sets of Φkj(·), Φkl(·), and j < l. We will show that
ukl(a) < ukl(p˜kj) for all a ∈ (p˜kj, v). Thus, no a ∈ (p˜kj, v) is a best response for the seller k
with availability of l units. Therefore, the support set of Φkl(·) is a subset of [c, p˜kj] ∪ [v].
We now complete the proof, by showing that ukl(a) < ukl(p˜kj) for all a ∈ (p˜kj, v):
1
l
ukl(a)−
1
j
ukj(a) = Ak,l,j(a)
Since l > j and p˜ ≤ p˜kj < a < v, by Lemma 2, Ak,l,j(a) is decreasing function of a for
a ∈ [p˜kj, v). Thus, Ak,j(a) < Ak,j(p˜kj) for a ∈ (p˜kj, v). On the other hand ukj(a) ≤ ukj(p˜kj) for
all a > p˜kj , since p˜kj is a best response of a seller with availability j, therefore ukl(p˜kj) > ukl(a).
Note that, in this stage, since Φkl(.) can have a jump at v, we cannot rule out v as a member
of the support set of Φkl(.).
Corollary 1. The support sets of Φkl(.) and Φkj(.) overlap at most at one point in [p˜, v).
For instance, note that in Figure 1, the support sets of Φ13 and Φ12 overlap only at p˜12, the
support sets of Φ12 and Φ11 overlap only at v, and there is no overlap between support sets of
Φ13 and Φ11.
Proof: Suppose two points x1 and x2, where x1 < x2 < v, and both points belong to the
intersection of the support sets of Φkj(·) and Φkl(·). Without loss of generality, consider j < l.
The price x2 > p˜j belongs to the support set of Φkl(.), which is a contradiction with Property
6.
Corollary 2. For prices less than v support sets are contiguous (Property 5), disjoint (except
possibly at one point) (Corollary 1), and in decreasing order of the number of available units
for sale (Property 6). Thus, there exists an increasing sequence akmk , ak,mk−1, . . . of positive real
numbers in (c, v] such that the seller k will randomize her price in the interval [aki, ak,i+1] and
possibly {v} when she has i units of commodity available for sale.
For instance, note that in Figure 1, the support sets of seller one are in decreasing order of
the number of available units for sale, and the aforementioned increasing sequence is p˜, p˜12, and
v.
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F. The Structure of Nash Equilibrium at Price v
We will investigate the possibility of having a jump at v. First, we prove Lemma 3 which
complements previous results by identifying the nature of overlap between Φkj(.) and Φk¯l(.)
for j ∈ {1, . . . , mk} and l ∈ {1, . . . , mk¯} for prices less than v. Using this lemma, we prove
Property 7 which is the main result of this section.
Lemma 3. For every price p˜ ≤ x < v, x should belong to the support sets Φkl(.) and Φk¯j(.)
such that l + j > d.
A contradiction argument is used to prove the lemma. Assume that there exist x, l, and j
such that x belongs to say Φkl(.) and Φk¯j(.), and l + j ≤ d. We show that in this case, the
expected number of units sold at x and x + ǫ are equal for seller k when offering l units, i.e.
Bkl(x) = Bkl(x + ǫ), and subsequently that ukl(x + ǫ) > ukl(x). Thus x is not a best response
for seller k who offers l units, which is a contradiction.
Proof: Suppose not. There exist x, l, and j such that x belongs to say Φkl(.) and Φk¯j(.),
and l + j ≤ d. We show that there exist j˜, ǫ > 0 such that x + ǫ belongs in the support set of
Φk¯j˜(.), and subsequently that ukl(x+ ǫ) > ukl(x). Thus x is not a best response for seller k who
offers l units which is a contradiction. Consider two cases:
• x = v˜k¯j . Using Corollary 2, x and x + ǫ belongs to the support set of Φk¯,j−1(.) when ǫ is
small enough. Take j˜ = j − 1.
• x < v˜k¯j . If ǫ is small enough, x and x+ ǫ belongs to the support set of Φk¯j(.). Take j˜ = j.
Note that since l + j ≤ d, l + j˜ ≤ d. We are going to argue that the expected number of
units sold at x and x + ǫ are equal for seller k, i.e. Bkl(x) = Bkl(x + ǫ). To show this, we
condition on the number of available units with the seller k¯. If k¯ has more than j˜ number of
available units, say f , then she will offer with price less than x with probability one. Thus
B˜kl(x|f) = B˜kl(x + ǫ|f) = d − f in which B˜.(.|.) is the conditional expected number of units
sold. If k¯ offers less than j˜ number of units, she will offer with price higher than x + ǫ with
probability one. Thus B˜kl(x|f) = B˜kl(x + ǫ|f) = l. If k¯ offers j˜ units, since l + j˜ ≤ d,
B˜kl(x|j˜) = B˜kl(x + ǫ|j˜) = l. Therefore the expected number of units sold at x and x + ǫ are
equal for seller k, and ukl(x+ ǫ) > ukl(x). The proof is complete.
Finally, the following property characterizes the behavior of NE at v.
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Property 7. For each k, there exists a threshold such that seller k offers price v with probability
one if she has the availability level less than or equal to this threshold. We denote this threshold
with lk. This threshold is such that:
• lk ∈ {ek, . . . , mk − 1}
• l1 + l2 = d− 1 or l1 + l2 = d
The price distribution Φkj(.) does not have a jump at v if j > lk + 1, at most one of the
distributions Φ1,l1+1(.) and Φ2,l2+1(.) can have a jump at v, and size of such a jump is less than
1.
Note that in Fig 1, l1 = l2 = 1, and l1 + l2 = d− 1. In addition, both sellers have a jump of
magnitude one at price v when they have one unit available, only seller two has a jump at price
v when the availability level is two, and there is no jump in the distribution functions when
sellers have three units available.
Proof: Take zk such that k offers price v with probability one if she has i ∈ {1, . . . , zk}
units. Property 2 shows that zk ≥ ek. We will prove that the zk should be less than mk. Note
that if seller k has mk units of availability and she offers her units with a single price v, then
p˜k = v. By Properties 4 and 6, the other seller, k¯, offers her units with a single price v regardless
of the number of available units. This is a contradiction. The reason is because of Lemma 1.
Since m1+m2 > d, if Φ1,m1(.) has a jump at v, then u2m2(v− ǫ) > u2m2l(v), for all sufficiently
small but positive ǫ. Thus v is not a best response for the second player when she offers m2
units, which is a contradiction. Thus zk < mk. Therefore zk ∈ {ek, . . . , mk − 1}.
First, suppose z1 + z2 ≥ d+ 1. By Lemma 1, v is not a best response for the player k when
she offers zk units, which is a contradiction. Therefore z1 + z2 ≤ d. Next, we will prove that
either z1+ z2 = d− 1 or z1+ z2 = d. Note that by the definition of zk, seller k with availability
zk + 1 cannot choose the price v with probability 1. Thus using this fact and Corollary 2, the
price x = v− ǫ for ǫ > 0 small enough is in the support sets of Φ1,z1+1(·) and Φ2,z2+1(·). Thus,
by Lemma 3, z1 + z2 ≥ d− 1. Knowing that z1 + z2 ≤ d. Take lk = zk, and the first part of the
property follows.
Now we should consider the possibility of having a jump at v for Φkj(.) for j ≥ lk + 1. We
will prove that the price distribution does not have a jump at v when seller k offers more than
lk + 1 units. Suppose Φkj(.) has a jump for j > lk + 1. Note that j + lk¯ > lk + lk¯ + 1 ≥ d. By
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Lemma 1, v is not a best response for the seller k¯ under availability lk¯ which contradicts the
definition of lk¯.
Now consider lk + 1. By definition of lk such a jump must have a size less than 1, should
it exist. We will prove that at most one of the distributions Φ1,l1+1(.) and Φk,l2+1(.) can have a
jump at v. Suppose not and both have a jump at v. By Lemma 1, since (l1 + 1) + (l2 + 1) > d,
v is not a best response for the player k when she offers lk + 1 units. This is a contradiction.
The result follows.
Revisiting Equation (4) implies that utility, uki(.), is continuous not only in interval [c, v), but
also at price v, if i ≤ d− lk¯−1. The reason is that for i ≤ d− lk¯−1, equation (4) depends only
on Φk¯j(.) where j ≥ lk¯ + 2, which is continuous at price v based on Property 7. If Φk¯lk¯+1(.) is
continuous at v then uki(.) is continuous in [c, v] for i ≤ d− lk¯.
G. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: Part 1 of Theorem 1 follows from Property 7. We now prove part 2. The support
set of Φk,lk+1(.) includes at least one x < v from Property 7. Thus, Properties 6 and 5 imply
part 2a of this part. Parts 2b and 2c follow from Properties 3 and 7, respectively.
We now prove part 3. We start with 3a. Consider i > lk+1. From Property 7, Φk,i(·) does
not have a jump at v. From part 2a and Property 6, v is not in the supports set of Φk,i(.) and
v˜k,i ≤ p˜k,i−1. The result can now be proved by induction starting with i = lk+2 using the fact
that there is no gap between the support sets (Property 5). Since v is not in the support set of
Φk,i(.), part 3b follows from Property 3. Part 3c follows from part 3a and Property 4.
Part 4 follows from the fact that every price in the support set of a NE, except those on the
boundaries, should be a best response for a seller. Thus they yield the same utility value. The
result follows for the boundary points of the support sets other than v from Property 3.
IV. ARBITRARY DEMAND
Note that the existence of the mixed strategy NE follows from Corollary 5.2 in [26]. In
this section, first we present the sufficiency theorem for d ≥ max{m1, m2} (Theorem 2).
Theorem 2 establishes that a strategy profile which satisfies the mentioned properties in Theorem
1 constitutes an NE when d ≥ max{m1, m2}. Note that unlike Theorem 1, the sufficiency
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theorem holds even when d = max{m1, m2}. Thus, the properties in Theorem 1 are both
necessary and sufficient conditions for an NE when d > max{m1, m2}, and only sufficient
conditions when d = max{m1, m2}. The sufficiency theorem naturally leads to an algorithm for
computing NE strategy profiles that satisfy the properties in Theorem 1 (Appendix C-A). Any
strategy profile obtained by the algorithm constitutes an NE by Theorem 2. In Section IV-B,
we argue that the computation of the NE strategies for d < max{m1, m2} can be reduced to
d = max{m1, m2}. This completes the entire framework.
A. The Sufficiency Theorem when d ≥ max{m1, m2}
Theorem 2. Consider a strategy profile that satisfies the properties enumerated in Theorem 1.
This strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium when d ≥ max{m1, m2}.
The proof is presented in Appendix B. In the proof, we use the fact that Ak,l,j(.) is non
increasing and non positive when d ≥ max{m1, m2}.
B. Allowing d ≤ max{m1, m2}
Note that all results before equation (4) also hold when d ≤ max{m1, m2}. Thus (4) can be
restated by replacing ek = d−mk¯ with ek = (d−mk¯)+:
Bkj(x) = j
(d−j)+∑
i=0
qk¯i +min{j, d}
m
k¯∑
i=(d−j)++1
(
1− Φk¯i(x)
)
qk¯i
+
m
k¯∑
i=(d−j)++1
Φk¯i(x)qk¯i(d− i)
+
(6)
Note that if mk > d, the utilities of all number of availability levels j ≥ d for player k are
equal:
ukd = uk,d+1 = · · · = ukmk = d
mk¯∑
i=1
(
1− Φk¯i(x)
)
qk¯i (7)
Let q˜k¯d =
∑mk¯
i=d qk¯i and Φ˜k¯d(x) =
∑mk¯
i=d
qk¯i
q˜k¯d
Φk¯i(x). Thus, q˜k¯d is the probability that the
availability level of seller k¯ is greater than or equal to d and Φ˜k¯d(x) is the average probability
distribution associated with selecting the price if seller k¯ availability is d or higher. Now, the term∑mk¯
i=d
(
1− Φk¯i(x)
)
qk¯i in the expression for uki(.) in (6) can be replaced by q˜k¯d(1−Φ˜k¯d(x)). Thus
the problem is reduced to finding the structure when d = max{m1, m2}. It was proved previously
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that a strategy profile that satisfies properties in Theorem 1 is a NE when d = max{m1, m2}.
Thus, a set of equilibria of the game when d < max{m1, m2} can be found by defining Φ˜kd(.)
and using the properties in Theorem 1. The distribution of each individual Φkj(.) for j ≥ d
cannot be determined uniquely and is not of significant interest.
V. THE SYMMETRIC SETTING
We now consider the symmetric setting in which ~q1 = ~q2 = ~q (clearly m1 = m2 = m). In this
case, it is natural to consider a symmetric NE, defined as follows,
Definition 3. An NE (Θ1(·),Θ2(·)) is said to be symmetric if Θ1(·) = Θ2(·).
Thus, when considering symmetric NE, in terminologies like Φ.(·),Θ.(·), u.(·), p˜·, we drop
the index that represents the seller and only retain the index that represents the number of units
available for sale. As a special case of the general setting (Sections III and IV), every symmetric
NE should satisfy the properties in Theorem 1 when d > m , and every strategy profile that
satisfies these properties is a NE when d ≥ m (Theorem 2). In Section V-A, we extend Theorem 1
to the case of d = m. In Section V-B, we will present an algorithm to find symmetric Nash
equilibria of the game when d ≥ m. Using the results in Section IV-B, the algorithm can be
extended to d < m.
Note that the algorithm reveals that there is only one symmetric strategy profile that satisfies
the properties. It follows from Theorems 1 and 2 that a symmetric NE strategy profile uniquely
exists when d ≥ m. In contrast, in Appendix C-C, we show that there may exist multiple Nash
equilibria for an asymmetric market. It is not clear if there exists an asymmetric NE for the
symmetric market; our extensive numerical evaluations have not however led such strategy.
A. Properties of a Symmetric Nash Equilibrium
Theorem 3. Let d = m. A symmetric NE in a symmetric market satisfies the properties in
Theorem 1.
The proof is technical and is relegated to the Appendix. It implies that properties in Theorem 1
are necessary and sufficient conditions for a symmetric NE when d ≥ m.
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Since NE is symmetric, l∗ = l1 = l2. Thus, l∗ = d−12 or l
∗ = d
2
, whichever is an integer. Since
at most one seller can have a jump at v at l∗ + 1, in a symmetric NE, none of them do. Thus,
the properties in Theorem 1 transform to the following in the symmetric context.
1) Sellers offer price v with probability 1, if they have i ∈ {1, . . . , l∗} available units.
2) There exists an increasing sequence am, am−1, . . . , al∗+1, al∗ of positive real numbers in
(c, v] with al∗ = v such that each seller randomizes her price in the interval [ai, ai−1] when
she has i units of commodity available for sale for i ∈ {l∗ + 1, . . . , m}. Thus,
a) Support sets are contiguous.
b) Support sets are disjoint (except possibly at one point).
c) Support sets are in decreasing order of the number of available units for sale.
3) Price distribution is continuous for i ≥ l∗.
4) The utility of a seller when she offers i units is equal for all prices in the support set of
Φi(.), except possibly at price v (if it belongs to her support set).
B. Algorithm for computing a symmetric NE for the symmetric setting
We will now identify an algorithm to compute strategies that exhibit the properties in the
previous subsection. The algorithm reveals that there is only one symmetric strategy profile that
satisfies the same. It follows from Theorem 1 and 2 that a symmetric NE strategy profile uniquely
exists when d ≥ m. Note that the algorithm is developed for d ≥ m. However, with the method
presented in Section IV-B, the algorithm can be used to find the equilibrium for d ≤ m.
Since Φj(·) is completely characterized for j < d+12 , we should characterize Φj(·) for j ≥
d+1
2
,
and outline a framework for computing the same. We proceed in an increasing order of j starting
with j = ⌈d+1
2
⌉. Then moving to j = ⌈d+1
2
⌉+ 1, etc.
Now, let ⌈d+1
2
⌉. Note that v˜⌈ d+1
2
⌉ = v and p˜k = v for k < ⌈d+12 ⌉, and v˜k ≤ p˜⌈ d+12 ⌉ for k > ⌈
d+1
2
⌉
(Properties 1 and 2c). Since support sets are ordered (Property 2c) and disjoint (Property 2b),
the expression for u⌈ d+1
2
⌉(x) for x ∈ [p˜⌈ d+1
2
⌉, v) only depends on Φ⌈ d+1
2
⌉(x)(Equation (4)). In
particular, u⌈ d+1
2
⌉(v
−) can be obtained using the fact that Φ⌈ d+1
2
⌉(v
−) = 1 which follows from
the continuity of Φ⌈ d+1
2
⌉(.) (Properties 3). Next, u⌈ d+1
2
⌉(x) = u⌈ d+1
2
⌉(v
−) for every x ∈ [p˜⌈ d+1
2
⌉, v).
Thus having u⌈ d+1
2
⌉(v
−), and using continuity, we can find a unique expression for Φ⌈ d+1
2
⌉(x).
Using Φ⌈ d+1
2
⌉(p˜⌈ d+1
2
⌉) = 0, p˜⌈ d+1
2
⌉ can be found uniquely.
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We now compute the structure of Φi(·), ∀i > ⌈d+12 ⌉ using Φi−1(.),Φi−2(.), · · · ,Φ⌈ d+12 ⌉(.) that
are computed before Φi(·). We utilize the facts that,
1) Φj(x) = 1 for j > i, x ∈ [p˜i, v˜i]
2) Φj(x) = 0 for j < i, x ∈ [p˜i, v˜i]
3) v˜i < v
Thus, from (4),
ui(v˜i) = (v˜i − c)
(
i
i−1∑
g=0
qg +
m∑
i
qg(d− g)
)
(8)
Since v˜i = p˜i−1, and p˜i−1 is computed during the computation of Φi−1(·), which precedes that
of Φi(·), (8) fully specifies ui(v˜i). Furthermore, for x ∈ [p˜i, v˜i] the only unknown variable in the
expression of ui(x) is Φi(x). Since ui(x) = ui(vi) for x ∈ [p˜i, v˜i],
Φi(x) =
i
∑i−1
g=0 qg + iqi +
∑m
g=i+1 qg(d− g)−
ui(v˜i)
x−c
qi(2i− d)
(9)
From (9), Φi(v˜i) = 1. Thus, for x ≥ v˜i, Φi(x) = 1. Now, p˜i can be uniquely identified using
the fact that Φi(p˜i) = 0,
p˜i = c +
(v˜i − c)
(
i
∑i−1
g=0 qg +
∑m
i qg(d− g)
)
i
∑i−1
g=0 qg + iqi +
∑m
g=i+1 qg(d− g)
(10)
Therefore Φi(x) = 0 for x ≤ p˜i. Clearly, Φi(·) has been characterized uniquely. Note that the
denominator of (10) is positive since d ≥ m and qm < 1 (uncertainty assumption in Section II).
In addition, p˜i > c. This is because of the fact that the second term of RHS of (10) is positive.
We now prove that Φi(·) is a valid probability distribution. Clearly, Φi(·) is continuous. Note
that in (9) for x ∈ [p˜i, v˜i), by increasing x, the term ui(vi)x−c will strictly decrease (since ui(v˜i) > 0),
and we can say that Φi(x) is strictly increasing. Also, Φi(p˜i) = 0 and Φi(v˜i) = 1. Thus,
0 ≤ Φi(x) ≤ 1 for x ∈ [p˜i, v˜i). Therefore, Φi(·) is non-decreasing and assumes values in [0, 1]
for all x. The claim follows. Thus we have uniquely identified a symmetric strategy that satisfies
the properties required by a Nash equilibrium.
VI. RANDOM DEMAND
We have so far assumed that the demand d is deterministic. In this section, we will generalize
the results to a random demand, D. Let rd denote the probability that the demand is d, Bkld(x)
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be the expected number of units that seller k sells if she offers l units for sale and quotes x as
the price per unit when the total demand is d, and ukld(x) be the expected utility in this case.
Clearly,
ukl(x) =
∑
d
rdukld(x) =
∑
d
rdBkld(x)(x− c)
We introduce d = min{d : d > 0 and rd > 0}. Utilizing similar proofs, we can show that all the
previous results about the structure of NE are valid for the random demand, once d is replaced
with d. This is but expected as each seller now chooses her price knowing that she is assured
of an overall demand of at least d (instead of d in the deterministic demand case). Algorithms
similar to those in the deterministic case can be developed for computation of the NE in both
symmetric and general cases.
VII. THE ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR
In this section, through numerical evaluations, we investigate the asymptotic behavior of the
symmetric NE of a symmetric duopoly market when the number of available units with a seller
increases to infinity. In asymptotic scenario, many of availability probability distributions that
arise naturally concentrate around the mean. Thus, qk → 0, when k is far from the mean. First,
we show that the length of the support set for availability of k units approaches zero as qk → 0:
From equation (10),
p˜i = c+
(p˜i−1 − c)(i
∑i−1
g=0 qg +
∑m
g=i qg(d− g))
i
∑i
g=0 qg +
∑m
g=i+1 qg(d− g)
= p˜i−1 + (p˜i−1 − c)
qi(d− 2i)
i
∑i
g=0 qg +
∑m
g=i+1 qg(d− g)
It is immediate that if qi → 0, then p˜i → p˜i−18. This implies that the length of the support set
for the availability level i units approaches zero.
We investigate the asymptotic behavior using numerical simulations when the availability of
each seller follows a binomial distribution (m, r < 1). With this distribution, as m → ∞, the
binomial distribution can be approximated by a normal distribution with mean mr and variance
mr(1− r). Thus m→∞ yields that p˜i → p˜i−1 when |i−mr| is large enough. In other words,
8Note that the denominator is positive since d ≥ m, and we assume uncertainty in competition, i.e. qm < 1.
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m: The Maximum Possible Availability
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Fig. 2: p˜ versus m for when availability level is binomial with probability p and demand is m
the length of the support set for the availability level i units approaches zero if i is far from the
mean. Other parameters are considered to be v = 10, c = 1, and d = m.
In Figure 2, the value of p˜, i.e. the lowest lower-bound is plotted versus m, i.e. the highest
possible level of availability. As you can see, the larger the probability r, the smaller p˜. Note
that when r is large, the seller is more likely to offer with higher levels of availability. Therefore
the competition is more intense. In addition, when m is increased, the distribution ~q of the
availability levels concentrates around the mean, mr. If r > 1
2
, when a seller offers k = mr,
knowing that the other seller offers mr > m
2
with positive probability, she will offer price less
than v (note that d = m). Furthermore, the higher m, the more intense the competition, and
consequently p˜ is decreasing. On the other hand, when r ≤ 1
2
, if a seller offers around mr
units, there is no competition between sellers knowing that 2mr ≤ d = m. Furthermore, the
availability probability qk, when k is far from mr, tends to zero when m is large. Thus the
associated support sets shrink to zero. This explains the increasing behavior of p˜. We notice
oscillation in the figure, since m alternates between odd and even.
VIII. APPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION
The framework we described in this paper can be used to model three different applications
in which uncertainty in competition naturally emerges: secondary spectrum access networks, a
non-neutral Internet market, and micro grid networks.
Pricing in secondary spectrum access networks [28] is one of the applications of our model.
Recent developments in wireless devices have resulted in a significant growth in demand for
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the radio spectrum. This leads to spectrum congestion. On the other hand, the available radio
spectrum is greatly under-utilized [29]. Spectrum congestion and under-utilization have directed
researchers to adopt new techniques in order to use the available spectrum more efficiently
and to decrease congestion. Secondary spectrum access is an example of these techniques. In
these networks, there are two types of users: (i) Primary/licensed users, who lease a number of
frequency bands (channels) directly from the regulator, and (ii) Secondary/unlicensed users, who
lease frequency bands from primary users for a certain amount of time in exchange for money or
other types of credit. Note that primary and secondary users correspond to sellers and buyers in
our model, respectively. Each primary user may have multiple vacant frequency bands available
for sale, and a secondary user can lease a channel only if it is not in use by the primary user
who owns it. The usage of subscribers of primary users is random and different for different
primaries. Thus primaries are uncertain about the competition, and they need to select prices
for the frequency bands they offer for sale, without knowing the number of frequency bands
available for sale with their competitors.
The next application of our model is the interaction between Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
and Content Providers (CPs) in a non-neutral Internet. Net neutrality on the Internet is perceived
as the policy that mandates ISPs to treat all data equally, regardless of the source, destination,
and type of the data [30]. This precludes ISPs from charging CPs to carry their data to the
end-users in the last-mile. In January 2014, a federal appeals court struck down parts of the
Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) rules for Net-Neutrality [31]. The new changes
in the Internet policies enable ISPs to change their policies and provide differential treatment
of traffic to generate additional revenue streams from CPs. This is called a non-neutral regime
for the Internet in which ISPs can offer resources to CPs for sale or rent. Our framework can
capture the pricing in this type of the Internet market. Here, ISPs represent the sellers that
offer resources for reservation/sponsorship, and CPs are the customers that shop around for the
lowest available prices. Therefore ISPs seek to set prices that will ensure that their resources
are reserved/sponsored and also fetch adequate profit. Note that ISPs determine the number of
resources available for sponsoring based on the demand of their end-users. The more congested
an ISP, the higher the demand of end-users, and therefore the lower the number of available
resources for sponsoring. Since the demand of end-users is not a priori known, the ISPs are not
aware of the number of units of resources available to her competitor before quoting her price.
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Thus, the competition that each ISP faces is uncertain.
The third example scenario pertains to pricing in micro grids [32]. A micro grid network
is a network of distributed power generating systems connected to local subscribers, and also
to the central macro power grid. The distributed generation of power at small on-site stations
is a promising alternative to the traditional generation at large stations. Decreasing the loss of
transmission by reducing the distance to consumption units 9, utilizing renewable energy sources,
decreasing the risk of blackout, and increasing security are some of the advantages of distributed
power generating scheme [33]. In these networks, a microgrid equipped with a distributed power
generating system can sell its excess power to other microgrids as well as the macro grid. Since
micro grids are emerging technologies 10, their market structure has not been finalized yet. Thus,
different market structures needs to be investigated. One possible scenario is a centralized market
in which micro grids sell their excess power to the macro grid or a local utility at a feed-in
tariff 11 [36]. Another scenario, which is investigated in this paper, is a distributed market in
which micro grids trade the power among themselves as also with macro grid at a price quoted
by them in a competitive market. Our model captures the second scenario in which each micro
grid with excess power (seller) sells its excess power to micro grids with deficient power or the
macro grid (buyers)12. The amount of power generated by a power generating system is not a
priori known and is different for different sellers. Thus, the sellers need to select prices for the
excess power they offer for sale, without knowing the number of power units available for sale
with their competitors (uncertainty in competition).
Note that in these applications, we considered the case that sellers sell their surplus supply.
The original supply is allocated to their subscribers, i.e. contracted customers, using either usage-
based or flat-rate pricing.
We now discuss about some details of the applications that arise in practice. Note that one
unit of commodity might be valued differently by different buyers in the above mentioned
9In microgrid networks, the power can be sold to or bought from other local micro grids. This reduces the distance the power
should be transmitted via the macro grid from a generation to a consumption site.
10Microgrids are emerging in different countries such as United States [34] and India [35].
11A feed-in tariff is an offer by the macro grid to purchase some or all of the output of a micro grid at a fixed or formula
rate.
12Note that each microgrid can be a seller or a buyer depending on the number of power units generated and the demand of
its subscribers. However, at a fixed time, the identity of a micro grid as a seller or a buyer is fixed.
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applications. For instance, different secondary users receive different rates for the same frequency
band, depending on their location. Similarly, different microgrids receive different amounts of
power owing to differences in power loss. Hence, different buyers have different utilities even
when they buy the same amount of commodity. However, in our formulations, we assumed that
the pricing structure is the same for all buyers, regardless of the differences in the utilities. We
justify this assumption as follow.
First note that in microgrid networks, the transmission loss is typically negligible, due to the
proximity of generators and consumers. Thus, all consumers receive approximately the same
utility for a unit of power they purchase. For Primary/Secondary markets and a Non-Neutral
Internet market, the utility of secondary users and CPs (as buyers) depends on the utility of
their end-users, and subsequently is different for different secondaries and CPs, depending on
the characteristics of their end-users. Sellers would not in general know the characteristics and
identities of the subscribers of potential buyers. Hence, prices quoted by the sellers cannot
depend on the utility of buyers. In addition, note that introducing a differential pricing for
customers complicates the pricing structure for them, and prevents an easy cost prediction and
management. For instance, in wireless settings, the channel quality of end-users and the rate
perceived by them are time and location dependent [37]. Thus, in a differential pricing scheme,
customers know the current pricing only when they use the service. But, customers are usually
reluctant to adopt differential pricing schemes, owing to the rapid variability of prices which is
not usually well-received by them [38]. In addition, sellers are also reluctant using a differential
pricing scheme for their end-users, as they are usually computationally complex. Therefore, we
did not consider different valuations for different customers in determining the pricing strategy
of sellers. However, differential pricing for users with different valuation might arise for other
applications; this constitutes a topic of future research.
IX. CONCLUSION
We investigated price competition in a duopoly market with uncertain competition when
different sellers may have different number of units available for sale. We modelled the in-
teractions among sellers as a non-cooperative game and listed a set of properties that are
sufficient conditions for a strategy profile to be an NE. We proved that these properties are
also necessary conditions for an NE in a symmetric market, or for some values of demand
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values in an asymmetric market. We showed that a symmetric NE uniquely exists and presented
an algorithm for computing the same. In Appendix E, using the results proved for a duopoly,
we proposed a heuristic pricing strategy for sellers in a symmetric oligopoly market. Numerical
results reveal that the proposed pricing strategies are good approximations of NE when sellers
are not too concerned about optimizing over small gains. A Direction for future work is to
consider different pricing for different types of demand.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: First consider the tuple < l, y > associated with the seller k¯ in which the first element
is the number of units she offers and the second one is the price she chooses. We introduce
D
(1)
kl (y, i, x) as the expected number of units sold by the seller k who wants to offer l units
with price y when her competitor’s tuple < g, z > 6=< i, x >, and D(2)kl (y, i, x) as the expected
number of units sold by the seller who wants to offer l units with price y when her competitor’s
tuple < g, z >=< i, x >. The expected number of units sold by a seller can be written as,
Bkl(y) = D
(1)
kl (y, i, x)Pr{< g, z > 6=< i, x >}
+D
(2)
kl (y, i, x)Pr{< g, z >=< i, x >}
Note that D(1)kl (a, i, x) ≤ D
(1)
kl (x, i, x) and D
(2)
kl (a, i, x) ≤ D
(2)
kl (x, i, x) for a ≥ x because the
number of units a seller sells is a non-increasing function of her price for any given amounts
offered by both sellers and any given price chosen by the competitor. Thus Bkl(a) ≤ Bkl(x). In
addition,
Bkl(x− ǫ
′)−Bkl(x) = (D
(1)
kl (x− ǫ
′, i, x)
−D
(1)
kl (x, i, x))Pr{< g, z > 6=< i, x >}
+ (D
(2)
kl (x− ǫ
′, i, x)−D
(2)
kl (x, i, x))Pr{< g, z >=< i, x >}
(11)
As we discussed D(1)kl (x, i, x) ≤ D
(1)
kl (x − ǫ
′, i, x). For D(2)kl (x, i, x), we should consider ties.
Since each buyer is equally likely to buy a unit from both sellers if both select equal prices,
we can say that D(2)kl (x, i, x) = l di+l < l (since i + l > d) and D
(2)
kl (x − ǫ, i, x) = l. Note
that Pr{other seller’s tuple < g, z >=< i, x >} = qi × Jump Size of Φki(.) at x. Thus, for all
positive ǫ′, RHS of (11) is greater than or equal to θ(x), where θ(x) is a positive number that
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does not depend on ǫ. Therefore since Bkl(a) ≤ Bkl(x), ∀a ≥ x, Bkl(x− ǫ′) ≥ Bkl(a) + θ(x),
for all a ≥ x. Thus,
ukl(x− ǫ
′)− ukl(a) ≥ (x− ǫ
′ − a)Bkl(a) + θ(x)(x− ǫ
′ − c)
Since x > c, for all sufficiently small ǫ′, x − ǫ′ − c > 0. In addition, since a ≤ x + ǫ by the
statement of the lemma, the lowest value for x − ǫ′ − a is −ǫ − ǫ′, and Bkl(a) ≤ l. Therefore
(x − ǫ′ − a)Bkl(a) + θ(x)(x − ǫ
′ − c) ≥ (−ǫ − ǫ′)l + θ(x). Therefore, for all sufficiently small
but positive ǫ and ǫ′,
ukl(x− ǫ
′) > ukl(a) a ∈ [x,min{x+ ǫ, v}]
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: The goal is to show that for each i and k all x ∈ [p˜ki, v˜ki) constitutes a best response
for the seller k who offers i units. That is, for each x ∈ [p˜ki, v˜ki) and for all y, uki(x) ≥ uki(y).
In addition, if Φki(·) associates positive probability with v˜ki, then uki(v˜ki) ≥ uki(y) for all y,
i.e., vki is a best response when the seller k offers i units. Note that the distributions, Φki(·)’s,
should satisfy Property 3. Thus, equations (4) and (5) holds for x < v, and Ak,l,j(x) is non
increasing and non positive with respect to x for l > j > ek¯.
We consider the case j ≤ ek¯ here. Thus, Bk,j(x) = j and Bk,l,j(x) = 1lBk,l(x)− 1. Note that
the expected number of units Bk,l(x) sold at price x when l units are offered is a non-increasing
function of x and Bk,l(x) ≤ l. Thus, Bk,l,j(x) and therefore Ak,l,j(x) is non increasing and non
positive with respect to x for l > j regardless of how j compares with ek¯.
Consider x < p˜. uki(x) ≤ i(x − c) < i(p˜ − c) = uki(p˜). The last equality follows from (4),
since Φkj(p˜) = 0 for all j. Therefore we consider x ≥ p˜ throughout the proof.
Suppose lk ∈ {0, 1, . . . , mk − 1} in Property 7 is fixed. We first start with i ≥ lk + 1. From
the assumption in Theorem 2, we know that uki(x) = uki(y) for any x, y in the interior of the
support set of Φki(·), the support set of Φki(·) is [p˜ki, v˜ki], Φki(·) is continuous at all x < v,
v˜ki < v for i > lk + 1, and v˜ki = v for i = lk + 1. Thus, if i > lk + 1 uki(x) = uki(y) for all
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x, y ∈ [p˜ki, v˜ki], and for i = lk + 1, uki(x) = uki(y) for all x, y ∈ [p˜ki, v˜ki). We consider the last
case in detail. Here, v˜ki = v. If k¯ has a jump at v when she offers lk¯ + 1 units, by Lemma 1,
uki(v) < uki(v− ǫ) for arbitrary small but positive ǫ. 13 If not, using equation (4) and continuity
of the price distributions included in that equation, it follows that uki(v) = uki(p˜ki). Thus, we
only need to prove that for all x, uki(p˜ki) ≥ uki(x). We do so by separately considering three
cases: 1. i ≥ lk + 1 and x ∈ [p˜, p˜ki) 2. i ≥ lk + 1 and x ∈ (v˜ki, v] 3. i ≤ lk.
1) i ≥ lk+1 and x ∈ [p˜, p˜ki): The claim follows by vacuity for i = mk. We therefore consider
i < mk. Since v˜kj = p˜k,j−1 for j ≥ lk + 1, any such x is in [p˜kg, p˜k,g−1) for some g > i. We
prove this claim by induction on g, starting with the base case of g = i+1. For x ∈ [p˜k,i+1, p˜ki),
1
i+ 1
uk,i+1(x)−
1
i
uki(x) = Ak,i+1,i(x)
1
i+ 1
uk,i+1(p˜ki)−
1
i
uki(p˜ki) = Ak,i+1,i(p˜ki)
uk,i+1(x) = uk,i+1(p˜ki)
Note that p˜ki = v˜k,i+1. Subtracting the first and the second equation, we get,
1
i
(uki(x)− uki(p˜ki)) = Ak,i+1,i(p˜ki)− Ak,i+1,i(x) ≤ 0
Since Ak,l,j(x) is non increasing and non positive with respect to x for l > j. Therefore
uki(x) ≤ uki(p˜ki) for x ∈ [p˜k,i+1, p˜ki). We want to prove that uki(x) ≤ uki(p˜ki) for x ∈
[p˜k,g+1, p˜kg), knowing that uki(x) ≤ uki(p˜ki) for x ∈ [p˜kg, p˜k,g−1) and mk − 1 ≥ g ≥ i + 1
(at the base we had g = i+ 1).
1
g + 1
uk,g+1(x)−
1
i
uki(x) = Ak,g+1,i(x)
1
g + 1
uk,g+1(p˜kg)−
1
i
uki(p˜kg) = Ak,g+1,i(p˜kg)
uk,g+1(x) = uk,g+1(p˜kg)
Note that p˜kg = v˜k,g+1. Subtracting the first and the second equation, we get,
1
i
(uki(x)− uki(p˜kg)) = Ak,g+1,i(p˜kg)− Ak,g+1,i(x) ≤ 0
Thus, uki(x) ≤ uki(p˜kg) for x ∈ [p˜k,g+1, p˜kg). The induction hypothesis yields uki(x) ≤ uki(p˜ki)
13Note that Lemma 1 holds for any arbitrary price distributions and not only those that are NE.
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for x ∈ [p˜k,g+1, p˜kg).
2) i ≥ lk + 1 and x ∈ (v˜ki, v]: We have just shown that uki(x) ≤ uki(p˜ki) for all x ∈ [p˜, p˜ki).
We now show the same for all x ∈ (v˜ki, v]. The claim follows by vacuity for i = lk + 1, since
v˜ki = v. We therefore consider i > lk + 1. Since v˜kj = p˜k,j−1 for lk + 1 ≤ j ≤ mk, and
v˜k,lk+1 = v, any such x is in (p˜kg, p˜k,g−1] for some lk + 1 < g < i. We prove this claim by
induction on g, starting with the base case of g = i− 1. Let x < v.
1
i
uki(x)−
1
i− 1
uk,i−1(x) = Ak,i,i−1(x)
1
i
uki(p˜k,i−1)−
1
i− 1
uk,i−1(p˜k,i−1) = Ak,i,i−1(p˜k,i−1)
uk,i−1(x) = uk,i−1(p˜k,i−1)
Subtracting the first and the second equation, we get,
1
i
(uki(x)− uki(p˜k,i−1)) = Ak,i,i−1(x) −Ak,i,i−1(p˜k,i−1) ≤ 0
Therefore uki(x) ≤ uki(p˜k,i−1) for x ∈ (p˜k,i−1, p˜k,i−2] \ v. The claim is established in the base
case if p˜k,i−2 < v. Else, if p˜k,i−2 = v, the claim has been shown only for x ∈ (p˜k,i−1, v) and
we still need to show that uki(v) ≤ uki(p˜k,i−1), which we proceed to do. Now, let x = v. if the
seller k¯ has a jump when it offers lk¯ + 1 units, since i > lk + 1, for all sufficiently small but
positive ǫ, uki(v) < uki(v− ǫ), and for sufficiently small but positive ǫ, v− ǫ ∈ (p˜k,i−1, v). Since
uki(v−ǫ) ≤ uki(p˜k,i−1), the base case follows. If not, that is seller k¯ does not have a jump when
it offers lk¯ +1 units, using equation (4) and continuity, we can deduce that uki(v) ≤ uki(p˜k,i−1).
The base case follows.
Now we want to prove that uki(x) ≤ uki(p˜k,i−1) for x ∈ (p˜k,g−1, p˜k,g−2], knowing that uki(x) ≤
uki(p˜k,i−1) for x ∈ (p˜kg, p˜k,g−1] and g ≤ i− 1 and g − 1 ≥ lk + 1. First, let x < v.
1
i
uki(x) −
1
g − 1
uk,g−1(x) = Ak,i,g−1(x)
1
i
uki(p˜k,g−1)−
1
g − 1
uk,g−1(p˜k,g−1) = Ak,i,g−1(p˜k,g−1)
uk,g−1(x) = uk,g−1(p˜k,g−1)
Subtracting the first and the second equation, we get,
1
i
(uki(x)− uki(p˜k,g−1)) = Ak,i,g−1(x) −Ak,i,g−1(p˜k,g−1) ≤ 0
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The inequality is because of the fact that Ak,l,j(x) is non increasing and non positive with
respect to x if l > j. Therefore uki(x) ≤ uki(p˜k,g−1). Furthermore we know from the assumption
of induction that uki(p˜k,g−1) ≤ uki(p˜k,i−1), thus uki(x) ≤ uki(p˜k,i−1) for x ∈ (p˜k,g−1, p˜k,g−2] \ v.
We can show that uki(v) ≤ uki(p˜k,i−1) if v ∈ (p˜k,g−1, p˜k,g−2] exactly as in the base case. The
proof that for each i ≥ lk + 1 each x ∈ [p˜ki, v˜ki) is a best response when a seller offers i units
is therefore complete.
3) i ≤ lk: Now let i ≤ lk. Thus, lk > 0. Consider two cases:
• lk + lk¯ = d− 1. Therefore i ≤ lk = d− lk¯ − 1. As we previously mentioned, utility uki(.),
is continuous not only in interval [c, v), but also at price v, if i ≤ d − lk¯ − 1. Using (5),
and the fact that Ak,l,j(x) is non increasing and non positive with respect to x, for l > j
and a similar argument to case 1, we can get uki(x) ≤ uki(v) for all x ∈ [p˜, v). The result
follows.
• lk + lk¯ = d. Therefore i ≤ lk = d− lk¯. Since lk + lk¯ +1 > d, neither Φklk+1(.) nor Φk¯lk¯+1(.)
have a jump at v, and uki(.) is continuous in [c, v]. The result follows by a similar argument
to that of in the previous case.
APPENDIX C
COMPUTATION OF NE STRATEGIES IN AN ASYMMETRIC SETTING
In this section, we consider the general case in which the setting may not be symmetric.
First we develop a framework to obtain the strategy profiles that satisfy the properties listed in
Theorem 1 (Section C-A). Then, we compute these strategies for a simple case of an asymmetric
market in which m1 = m2 = d = 3 (Section C-B). In Section C-C, we show that the system
may have multiple Nash equilibria.
A. Framework for computation
In Theorem 2, it has been proved that the properties listed in Theorem 1 are sufficient properties
for a NE whether d > {m1, m1} or d = max{m1, m2}. In this section, we use Theorem 1 to
obtain a framework to identify a set of Nash equilibria for the game.
First, fix l1 and l2 (refer to Property 7). In addition, note that Theorem 1 specifies the ordering
of support sets for a seller and not the relative ordering of support sets of the two sellers. Thus,
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we fix an ordering of p˜ki’s and p˜k¯j’s for i ∈ {lk + 1, . . . , mk} and j ∈ {lk¯ + 1, . . . , mk¯} such
that for seller k and k¯ the lower bounds are ordered with a decreasing relation with i and j
respectively, and p˜kmk = p˜k¯mk¯ = p˜. The unknowns that we should determine for a NE are p˜,
mk− lk−1 and mk¯− lk¯−1 number of lower bounds other than p˜ for seller k and k¯ respectively,
and the distribution of price over each support set.
For these particular l1, l2, and relative ordering of support sets, based on Theorem 1, the NE
is the solution of:
uki(p˜ki) = uki(p˜
−
k,i−1) i ∈ A
uk¯j(p˜k¯j) = uk¯j(p˜
−
k¯,j−1
) j ∈ A
uki(p˜ki) = uki(p˜
−
k¯j
) i ∈ A, j : p˜k¯j ∈ (p˜ki, p˜k,i−1)
uk¯j(p˜k¯j) = uk¯j(p˜
−
ki) j ∈ A, i : p˜ki ∈ (p˜k¯j, p˜k¯,j−1)
f1f2 = 0
(12)
where A = {lk + 1, . . . , mk}. In addition, f1 and f2 are the magnitude of jump at v for the
first and second seller when they offer lk + 1 and lk¯ + 1 units, respectively. Note that the first
four sets of equations are derived using the fact that the utility of a seller should be equal over
the entire support set. The fifth equation ensures that only one seller can have a positive jump
at v.
In equation (12), the unknowns are p˜, m1 +m2 − l1 − l2 − 2 number of lower-bounds other
than p˜, p1, p2, and m1 +m2 − l1 − l2 − 2 number of probability distributions at some specific
points. That is Φki(p˜k¯j) for i ∈ {lk + 1, . . . , mk} and j such that p˜k¯j ∈ (p˜ki, p˜k,i−1). By solving
the system of equations (12), we can get a candidate NE.
Using the solution, Φki(.) for k ∈ {1, 2} and i ∈ {1, . . . , mk} can be found. To find the
distributions of price for prices less than v, first note that each price x ∈ [p˜, v) which is not
a lower bound for the support set belongs to exactly one of the support sets of each seller.
Therefore, by (4), the expression of utility of player k when it offers i units depends only on x
and Φkj(x), i.e. uki(x) = (x − c)G(Φkj(x)), where G(Φ.(.)) is a decreasing function of Φ.(.),
and therefore its inverse exists. On the other hand, the utilities at the lower bounds are obtained
from (12) for both sellers. Using Property 4, Φk¯j(x) = G−1(uki(p˜kj)x−c ). If the resulting Φk¯j(·) are
valid probability distribution functions, using Theorem 2 we can conclude that they constitute a
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c
p˜11 = v
p˜21 = vp˜ = p˜13 = p˜23
p˜12
p˜222nd Seller
1st Seller
Fig. 3: Structure corresponding to l1 = 1 and l2 = 1
NE for the given l1, l2, and the fixed ordering of lower bounds.
We have shown how to obtain a Nash equilibrium given one exists for a particular choice of
l1, l2, and a relative ordering between the support sets of the two sellers. Note that by changing
the choices of the above we can possibly obtain multiple Nash equilibria. In the next sections,
we present an example in which there exist at least two equilibria.
B. Example illustration of computation of Nash Equilibria
Consider the case in which each seller offers up to three units and the total demand is exactly
three units, i.e. d = 3. Without loss of generality we assume that l1 ≥ l2; the strategy profiles
in the other case l1 < l2 can be obtained by swapping the indices of the sellers.
1) First we focus on the case in which l1 + l2 = d − 1 = 2. In this case, l1 = l2 = 1 or
l1 = 2, l2 = 0. If l1 = l2 = 1, then sellers choose v with probability 1, if they offer 1 unit of
commodity. In order to specify the NE, we should find the lower bounds p˜13 = p˜23 = p˜, p˜12,
p˜22, jumps at price v (f1 and f2), and each distribution Φkj(.) for all k = 1, 2, and j = 2, 3.
First consider the ordering of lower bounds in which p˜22 ≥ p˜12 (Figure 3). The system of
equations is presented in the next page. Using equations (13), (15), (17), and (18), we can find
p˜22 as,
p˜22 =
(v − c)A
1
2 −
1
2q13
+ c
A =
(
2q10 + 2q11 + q12(1 + f1)−
3
2
q20 −
3
2
q21
−
3
4
q22(1 + f2)
)
(20)
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u13(p˜) = u13(p˜12) ⇒ 3(p˜ − c) = (3− 3q23Φ23(p˜12))(p˜12 − c) (13)
u23(p˜) = u23(p˜12) ⇒ 3(p˜ − c) = (3− 3q13)(p˜12 − c) (14)
u23(p˜) = u23(p˜22) ⇒ 3(p˜ − c) = (3− 3q13 − 2q12Φ12(p˜22))(p˜22 − c) (15)
u12(v
−) = u12(p˜22) ⇒ (v − c)(2q20 + 2q21 + 2q22f2 + q22(1 − f2)) = (p˜22 − c)(2 − 2q23) (16)
u12(v
−) = u12(p˜12) ⇒ (v − c)(2q20 + 2q21 + 2q22f2 + q22(1− f2)) = (p˜12 − c)(2 − 2q23Φ23(p˜12)) (17)
u22(v
−) = u22(p˜22) ⇒ (v − c)(2q10 + 2q11 + 2q12f1 + q12(1 − f1)) = (p˜22 − c)(2− 2q13 − q12Φ12(p˜22)) (18)
f1f2 = 0 (At most one seller can have a jump at v ) (19)
System of equations for l1 = l2 = 1 and p˜22 ≥ p˜12
On the other hand, from (16),
p˜22 =
(v − c)(2q20 + 2q21 + q22(1 + f2))
2− 2q23
+ c (21)
The values of p˜22 in (20) and (21) should be equal. Utilizing this and (19),
2f1q12
1− q13
−
1
2
q22f2A = (q20 + q21 +
1
2
q22)A
−
4q10 + 4q11 + 2q12
1− q13
= B
(22)
where A = 1
1−q23
+ 3
1−q13
. Therefore,


f1 = f2 = 0 if B = 0
f1 > 0&f2 = 0 if B > 0
f2 > 0&f1 = 0 if B < 0
(23)
Therefore f1, f2, and p˜22 are uniquely determined. Using (18), Φ12(p˜22) can be derived uniquely,
Φ12(p˜22) =
1
q12
(
2− 2q13 −
v − c
(p˜22 − c)
(2q10 + 2q11 + q12(1 + f1))
) (24)
By (15), p˜ can be derived uniquely, (14) determines p˜12 uniquely, and (13) provides us Φ23(p˜12)
uniquely. However, we should check whether Φ23(p˜12) and Φ12(p˜22) are between zero and one
or not. If not, then this NE candidate is not valid. The distributions can be found by the process
explained previously.
Another possible ordering of lower bounds is when p˜22 ≤ p˜21. The system of equations
corresponding to this case can be obtained by swapping the index of sellers.
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c
p˜11 = p˜12 = v
vp˜ = p˜13 = p˜23
p˜22
p˜21
2nd Seller
1st Seller
Fig. 4: Structure corresponding to l1 = 2 and l2 = 0
c
p˜11 = p˜12 = v
p˜21 = vp˜ = p˜13 = p˜23 p˜22
2nd Seller
1st Seller
Fig. 5: Structure corresponding to l1 = 2 and l2 = 1
In the case of l1 = 2 and l2 = 0, Figure 4 illustrates a schematic view of the support sets for
the unique relative ordering of support sets. Equations can be obtained with a similar approach
to the previous case.
2) l1 + l2 = 3 = d. Note that lk = 3 and lk¯ = 0 can be ruled out since lk should be less than
mk = 3. Thus, l1 = 2 and l2 = 1 (Figure 5). The approach to find the equilibria is similar to the
previous cases.
C. Multiple Nash Equilibria
In Section V, we proved that the symmetric NE uniquely exists. In this section, we show that
an asymmetric market allows for multiple Nash equilibria. Nash equilibria are computed using
the above framework with v = 10 and c = 1 and for different values of ~q1 and ~q2. Some lead to
a unique NE and some others to multiple Nash equilibria. For instance, the NE is unique, if
~q1 = [0.45, 0.1, 0.4, 0.05] ~q2 = [0.2, 0.2, 0.45, 0.15]
In this case, in the NE strategy, l1 = 1, l2 = 2, p˜12 = 9.0526, p˜ = 8.65, and Φ23(p˜12) = 0.3333,
and the second seller has a jump of size 0.625 at price v = 10. However, there are two Nash
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equilibria if:
~q1 = [0.05, 0.1, 0.4, 0.45] ~q2 = [0.2, 0.2, 0.4, 0.2]
In both NE, l1 = 2, l2 = 1, and Φ13(p˜22) = 0.4444. In the first NE, f2 = 0.06525, f1 = 0,
p˜ = 5.95, and p˜22 = 7.1875. In the second NE, f2 = 0, f1 = 0.7778, p˜ = 5.8, and p˜22 = 7.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Before going to the proof of Theorem 3, we need to prove some lemmas and theorems. First
we prove that Al,j(x) is (strictly) decreasing for v > x ≥ p˜m−1 when d = m (Lemma 4).
Then, in Lemma 5, we prove that the minimum of the lower end points is the lower end point
of Φm(x), i.e., p˜ = p˜m. Next, using Lemmas 4 and 5, we prove that p˜i /∈ [p˜m, p˜m−1) for
i ∈ {1, . . . , m− 2}. This establishes the ordering for Φm(.) and Φm−1(.). After that we proceed
to establish the ordering for the remaining support sets Φj(.) for j ∈ {1, . . . , m− 2}, knowing
that for them p˜j ≥ p˜m−1. A similar result to the Property 6 is proved in Property 8. Finally, we
prove Theorem 3.
Note that a symmetric NE in a symmetric market is considered in this section. Let us define
Al,j(x) =
1
l
ul(x)−
1
j
uj(x). Bl,j(x) is defined such that,
Al,j(x) = (x− c)Bl,j(x)
where,
Bl,j(x) = −
1
l
d−j∑
i=d−l+1
Φi(x)qi(i− d+ l)+
m∑
i=d−j+1
Φi(x)qi(d− i)(
1
l
−
1
j
)
(25)
Based on the following lemma, Al,j(x) is (strictly) decreasing for v > x ≥ p˜m−1 and l > j,
when d = m.
Lemma 4. For every l and j, l > j ≥ 1, Al,j(x) is (strictly) decreasing for v > x ≥ p˜m−1 when
d = m.
We argued that Bl,j(·) is non increasing and non positive with respect to the price x. To prove
that Al,j(.) = (x− c)Bl,j(x) is strictly decreasing, it is enough to prove that Bl,j(·) is negative.
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We will prove that Φm−1(x) is included in the summation of Bl,j(·) and obviously positive for
x > p˜m−1. In addition, its coefficient is negative since d = m > m− 1. Thus, the result follows.
Proof: It is enough to prove that Bl,j(x) is non-increasing for x ≥ p˜m−1 and negative for
x > p˜m−1 when demand is m. This yields that Al,j(x) = (x − c)Bl,j(x) is strictly decreasing
with respect to x.
Note that in (25), Φi(.)’s are non-negative and non-increasing since they are probability
distributions. In addition, they have non-positive weights: −(i − d − l) ≤ −1 < 0, 1
l
− 1
j
< 0,
and d − i ≥ d − m = 0 (note that d = m). Thus Bl,j(x) is non increasing and non positive
with respect to the price x when l ≥ j. To prove that Bl,j(x) is negative for x > p˜m−1, since
d− (m−1) = 1 > 0 and −(i−d− l) ≤ −1 < 0 (possible coefficients of Φm−1(x)) , it is enough
to prove that Φm−1(.) is included in the summation of Bl,j(.) and it is positive, i.e. Φm−1(x) > 0
for x > p˜m−1. The later follows from the definition of p˜m−1.
Now we prove that Φm−1(.) is included in the summation of Bl,j(.). Note that l > j ≥ 1.
Thus l ≥ 2, and the lowest index of the (25) is d − l + 1 ≤ m − 2 + 1 = m − 1. The result
follows.
To prove the ordering and disjoint properties in the symmetric setting we should alter the
proofs. First we will prove that p˜ = p˜m, i.e. the minimum of lower bounds is the lower bound
of Φm(x). Then we will prove that p˜j /∈ [p˜m, p˜m−1) for j ∈ {1, . . . , m− 2}. This proves that the
next lowest support set is the support set of Φm−1(.). After that using Lemma 2 will prove that
the support set of Φl(.) for l < m is a subset of [p˜m−1, pj] for all integers j ∈ [1, l). These three
all together establishes the ordering.
Lemma 5. p˜ = p˜m, i.e. the minimum of lower end points is the lower end point of Φm(x).
Proof: Suppose not and there exists x > p˜ such that x ≤ p˜m. By Property 5, there exists an
ǫ > 0 and an availability level j 6= m such that [p˜m − ǫ, p˜m] belongs to the support set of Φj(.)
and p˜j < p˜m. Thus uj(p˜m) = uj(p˜m−ǫ). In addition, Bm,j(x) is the weighted summation of Φi(.)
for i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Thus, the distribution Φj(.) is included in the summation of Bm,j(x), and its
coefficient is negative. In addition, Φj(x) > 0 for x > p˜j . Thus, Am,j(x) is strictly decreasing
with respect to x for x > p˜j . Thus Am,j(p˜m − ǫ) > Am,j(p˜m). Note that uj(p˜m) = uj(p˜m − ǫ).
Thus, um(p˜m) = um,max < um(p˜m − ǫ). This contradicts with p˜m belonging to the support set
of Φm(.). The result follows.
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Lemma 6. p˜i /∈ [p˜m, p˜m−1) for i ∈ {1, . . . , m− 2}.
To prove this, we use a contradiction argument. Suppose that there exists p˜j ∈ [p˜m, p˜m−1)
such that j ∈ {1, . . . , m− 2}. We will prove that no x ∈ (p˜j, p˜m−1] is in the support of Φm(.).
Thus there exists u ∈ {1, . . . , m − 2} such that p˜m−1 is in the support set of Φu(.). We prove
that the payoff of the seller when she offers u units with price p˜m−1 + ǫ is strictly greater than
the payoff when offering with price p˜m−1. This is in contradiction with p˜m−1 being the best
response for player with availability u.
Proof: The lemma follows by vacuity if m ≤ 2. Take m > 2. Note that p˜m−1 < v. If not
there is a jump of size 1 at price v when the seller offers m− 1 units. Since 2m− 2 > d = m
for m > 2, using Lemma 1, um−1(v− ǫ) > um−1(v) for ǫ small enough. This is in contradiction
with assigning a positive probability to price v in the equilibrium when seller offers m−1 units.
Thus p˜m−1 < v.
Suppose there exists p˜j ∈ [p˜m, p˜m−1) such that j ∈ {1, . . . , m − 2}. We will prove that
no x ∈ (p˜j, p˜m−1] is in the support of Φm(.). Thus (using this and Property 5), there exists
u ∈ {1, . . . , m− 2} such that p˜m−1 is in the support set of Φu(.). Consider Bm−1,u(x) which is
the summation of weighted distributions Φi(x) when i ∈ {2, . . . , m− 1}. Thus, the distribution
Φm−1(.) is included in the summation of Bm−1,u(x) (note that m > 2), and its coefficient
is negative (Note that d > 0). Thus, Am−1,u(x) is strictly decreasing with respect to x for
x > p˜m−1. Thus Am−1,u(p˜m−1 + ǫ) < Am−1,u(p˜m−1). Using um−1(p˜m−1) = um−1(p˜m−1 + ǫ), we
can conclude that uu(p˜m−1) = uu,max < uu(p˜m−1 + ǫ). This is in contradiction with p˜m−1 being
the best response for player with availability u. Note that p˜m−1 < v, and every price less than
v which belongs to the support set of a distribution Φi(.) should be a best response for players
when offering i units. The lemma follows.
Now we complete the proof by proving that no x ∈ (p˜j, p˜m−1] is in the support of Φm(.).
Suppose not. We will show that there exist an availability level f and two prices y1 and y2, such
that p˜j < y1 < p˜m−1, belongs to the support set of Φm(.), and both y1 and y2 belong to the
support set of Φf (.). Then we will show that um(y1) < um(y2), which contradicts with y1 being
in the support set of Φm(.).
Using the contradiction assumption, w is defined as,
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w = inf
x∈(p˜j ,p˜m−1] & x ∈ Supp(Φm(.))
x
Note that w is in the support set of Φm(.). Now consider two cases:
1) w > p˜j : Using continuity, the definition of support sets, and Property 5, there exist ǫ and
f ∈ {1, . . . , m− 2} such that w and w− ǫ is in the support set of Φf (.). Take y1 = w and
y2 = w − ǫ.
2) w = p˜j: Using continuity and the definition of infimum, there exists ǫ such that every
w+ ǫ belong to the support set of Φm(.) and Φj(.). Take f = j, y1 = w+ ǫ, and y2 = w.
Next, we will prove that um(y1) < um(y2), which contradicts with y1 being in the support
set of Φm(.). Note that y1 < v, and every price less than v which belongs to the support set of
a distribution Φi(.) should be a best response for players when offering i units. This completes
the proof.
Consider Bm,f (x) which is the summation of weighted distributions Φi(x) when i ∈ {1, . . . , m−
1}. Thus, the distribution Φf (.) is included in the summation of Bm,f(x), and its coefficient is
negative. Thus, Am,f (x) is strictly decreasing with respect to x for x ≥ p˜f . Thus Am,f(y2) >
Am,f (y1). Using uf(y1) = uf(y2), we can conclude that um(y1) < um(y2). The contradiction
argument is complete.
Therefore we established the ordering for Φm(.) and Φm−1(.). Now we are set to establish
the ordering for the remaining support sets Φj(.) for j ∈ {1, . . . , m− 2}, knowing that for them
p˜j ≥ p˜m−1. The next is the counterpart of the Property 8 in symmetric setting.
Property 8. The support set of Φl(.) is a subset of [p˜, p˜j] ∪ [v] for all integers j ∈ [1, l).
Proof: Consider support sets of Φj(·), Φl(·), and j < l. We will show that ul(a) < ul(p˜j)
for all a ∈ (p˜j, v). Thus, no a ∈ (p˜j, v) is a best response for the seller with availability of l
units. Therefore, the support set of Φl(·) is a subset of [p˜, p˜j] ∪ [v].
We now complete the proof, by showing that ul(a) < ul(p˜j) for all a ∈ (p˜j, v):
1
l
ul(a)−
1
j
uj(a) = Al,j(a)
Note that if p˜j ≥ v, property follows by vacuity. Now we consider p˜j < v. Since j < l ≤ m,
j ≤ m− 1. By Lemma 6, p˜m−1 ≤ p˜j < a < v, by Lemma 4, Al,j(a) is decreasing function of a
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for a ∈ [p˜m−1, v). Thus, Al,j(a) < Al,j(p˜j) for a ∈ (p˜j, v). On the other hand uj(a) ≤ uj(p˜j) for
all a > p˜j , since p˜j is a best response of a seller with availability j, therefore ul(p˜j) > ul(a).
Now we will prove the Theorem 3:
Proof: Note that the first place that we used the condition d > max{m1, m2} (in symmetric
setting d > m) instead of d = max{m1, m2} (d = m) was in Section III-E. Thus all of the
results before that apply also to the case that d = m. Property 8 provides exactly the same
property in the Property 6 for the symmetric scenario. Thus the corollaries after the property
follows. In addition, results in the Section III-F follows, since they are based on results before
the Section III-E and Property 6 and its corollaries. Thus Theorem 1 goes through in the case
of a symmetric NE and d = m.
APPENDIX E
OLIGOPOLY MARKET
Suppose that the setting is symmetric and there exist n sellers in the market. We consider a
strategy that satisfies the properties identified for a symmetric NE in Section V with the difference
that in our proposed strategies the threshold l∗ = ⌊ d
n
⌋. Note that the algorithm for finding such
a strategy is similar to what is presented in Section V-B, but the results would be different. We
now investigate how well this strategy approximates an NE strategy in an oligopoly market.
We numerically compute the maximum expected utility for a particular seller, when all other
sellers choose the proposed strategy (best response utility, UBest Response). We observe that over a
large set of parameters for all possible availability levels, the best response utility is either the
same as the expected utility obtained by following the proposed strategy (UProposed Strategy), or is
fairly close to this value 14.
For instance, consider a market in which the availability of each seller follows a binomial
distribution, B(m, p), with binomial probability p = 0.4 and m = 3 (m is the maximum possible
available units with each seller). In addition, in this market the demand is d = max{n,m},
v = 10, and c = 1. We plot the relative difference, described as follows, between the best
14For large sets of parameters, the difference is at most 5 percent of the value of the expected utility resulted by the proposed
strategy.
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Fig. 6: The relative difference of the best response expected utility and the expected utility of
the proposed strategy versus different number of sellers
response utility and the expected utility of the proposed strategy versus different number of
sellers, i.e. n, for different availability levels in Figure 6.
Relative Difference = UBest Response − UProposed Strategy
UProposed Strategy
Note that the relative difference is zero for all availability levels when there exist 2, 3, and 6
sellers in the market. Thus, the proposed strategy is a NE of the market in these cases. Although,
in the case of 4 and 5 sellers the proposed strategy is not an NE when a seller has 1 and 2
units of commodity available, respectively, the relative difference in these cases is less than 3
percent. Thus, overall, we can say that the proposed strategy is a good approximations of NE
when sellers are not too concerned about optimizing over small gains.
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